Munich, Part 2

So, despite my lengthy post below, I have not yet exhausted my thoughts on the subject of violence and the mushy thinking that accompanies discussions of it. Now, as I noted below, my recent ruminations on this topic have been prompted by movie reviews of Munich. And, admittedly, movie reviews are not exactly a sophisticated realm of socio-political discussion. Most of things I have read in these review echo arguments that I have heard again and again elsewhere.

First, to return to the topic of revenge in Munich. One thing that bothers me about the discussion surrounding this movie is that revenge is discussed absent the concept of alternatives and the fact that Israel was de facto at war with its enemies. In war, killing one's enemies is not considered to be morally problematic. So why are the killings in Munich presented as morally troubling "revenge" killings? They are no more revenge than the Allied invasion of Normandy was "revenge" for the Fall of France. Also, what was the alternative? Revenge is considered wrong in law-abiding societies because it substitutes extra-judicial killing for the legal process. But there was no real chance to apprehend and try those behind the Munich massacre. (Besides, when Israel apprehended and tried Adolf Eichmann for his role in the Holocaust, it was widely criticized for its methods. In fact, some argued Israel should have just killed Eichmann instead of proceeding with a show trial.)

Second, one oftens hears complaints about the use of the word "evil" to describe terrorists, murderers, psychopaths, genocidaires and other assorted folk. This word does not lead us to better understand these people. Perhaps not. But here is the definition of evil. It applies. And to not use the word displays, to me, a greater lack of understanding. It is to refuse to call a spade a spade, and then to pat yourself on the back for doing so. It is ignorance masquerading as sophistication. Those who shoot, hack, or starve to death innocent people are evil. This does not, it is true, reveal the nature of there malevolence, nor their motives. But it does pass moral judgment on the killers, and that is, unto itself, useful. The greatest problem with discussing genocide is not that we are too quick to call the perpetrators evil, it is that we are too slow to. And that tardiness in identifying evil leads to tardiness in combatting it.